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How Do We Get the Place of Europe 
in World History Right? 
Gregory Melleuish (University of Wollongong) 
One of the great insults of the contemporary historical world is the 
term ‘Eurocentric’. It is invariably combined with notions of 
European imperialism and the supposed desire of Europe to dominate 
the world. In fact the term ‘Eurocentric’ can have a fairly innocuous 
meaning, denoting no more than the simple observation that the 
terminology and periodisation that we use to describe European 
history may not have any relevance when we are dealing with non- 
European civilisations. For example what does ‘pre-modern’ mean in 
a Chinese context where many of the features of European modernity 
have been present for over a thousand years?1 
It is important to get the place of Europe in world history 
right. To use terms derived from the Australian experience, neither 
the ‘black arm band’ nor the ‘three cheers’ views of European history 
provide any real insight into its nature. One should neither belittle the 
European achievement nor attempt to exaggerate its significance. 
Only when Europe is placed in a proper world context will this be 
possible. 
As a means of achieving some balance in this matter I should 
like to consider two recent attempts to provide a picture of Europe’s 
relationship to the rest of the world. The first is John Hobson’s The 
Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation, a book by a man with a 
mission to expose the arrogance of Europe and the West. The second 
is Richard Bulliet’s Islamo-Christian Civilization.2 Both of these 
works want to establish the proper historical context for understanding 
Europe. That is a fine purpose but unfortunately both of these 
books are driven as much by contemporary political agendas as by 
scholarly historical ones. They both pursue specific and explicit 
1 See R. Bin Wong, China Transformed (Ithaca, 1997), especially chapter 4. 
2 John M. Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation (Cambridge, 
2004), Richard W. Bulliet, The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization (New York, 
1984). 
  
 
380 The Place of Europe 
political agendas that do not do anything to enhance their arguments. 
Rather they make any reader suspicious of what they have to say. 
Hobson and Bulliet have somewhat different agendas. Hobson 
wants to establish the importance of the East, and China in particular, 
as the source of much of the technological innovation usually ascribed 
to Europe, while Bulliet wants to establish what Western Europe and 
the Islamic world have in common. But both are seeking to perform a 
similar task to that of Dipesh Chakrabarty’s when he sought to 
‘provincialize’ Europe. The irony in Chakrabarty’s case was that he 
had to use the intellectual armoury of Europe, in the shape of Marx 
and Heidegger, to undertake his project.3 
Hobson, in particular, has a very strong tendency to overstate 
his case. He seems to be obsessed with demonstrating that the West 
has an enormous hubris when it comes to it own achievements, most 
of which he argues came from elsewhere, and that it is a moral 
inferior in comparison with other civilisations. 
His major target appears to be the nineteenth-century view that 
Europe was dynamic and progressive while the East was sunk in 
‘oriental despotism’ and therefore stagnant and lacking in creativity. 
He spends much of his time demonstrating that many of the 
inventions claimed by Europeans as their own in fact had eastern, 
especially Chinese, origins. Some of this has been known for a long 
time, for example that both paper and printing came originally from 
China, but Hobson takes it much further. In any case, who was the 
original creator of any invention is often not all that important 
because, as Gordon Childe pointed out over 50 years ago, what really 
matters is how that technology is developed and adapted over a long 
period of time.4 
Hobson works with a diffusionist model of culture. According 
to this model inventions are made only once and then spread 
elsewhere throughout the world. He has a strange view that it was the 
pastoral Avars who somehow transmitted the agricultural plough to 
the Slavs.5 His history is strained at times as he is determined always 
to make Europe into the villain and to demonstrate the superiority of 
other civilisations, especially China. 
3 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe (Princeton, 2000), especially the 
introduction. 
4 V.G. Childe, History (London, 1947). 
5 Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation, p. 102. 
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Were Europeans in the nineteenth century as dismissive of the 
‘East’ as Hobson would seem to believe? Consider the following 
passage from Tocqueville in Democracy in America about China: 
When Europeans first arrived in China, three hundred years 
ago, they found that almost all the arts had reached a certain 
degree of perfection there, and they were surprised that a 
people which had attained this point should not have gone 
beyond it. At a later period they discovered traces of some 
higher branches of science that had been lost. The nation was 
absorbed in productive industry; the greater part of its scientific 
processes had been preserved, but science itself no longer 
existed there. This served to explain the strange immobility in 
which they found the minds of this people. The Chinese, in 
following the track of their forefathers, had forgotten the 
reasons by which the latter had been guided. They still used the 
formula without asking for its meaning; they retained the 
instrument, but they no longer possessed the art of altering or 
renewing it. The Chinese, then, had lost the power of change; 
for them improvement was impossible. They were compelled at 
all times and in all points to imitate their predecessors lest they 
should stray into utter darkness by deviating for an instant from 
the path already laid down for them. The source of human 
knowledge was all but dry; and though the stream still ran on, 
it could neither swell its waters nor alter its course. 
Notwithstanding this, China had existed peaceably for 
centuries. The invaders who had conquered the country 
assumed the manners of the inhabitants, and order prevailed 
there. A sort of physical prosperity was everywhere discernible; 
revolutions were rare, and war was, so to speak, unknown. 
It is then a fallacy to flatter ourselves with the reflection 
that the barbarians are still far from us; for if there are some 
nations that allow civilization to be torn from their grasp, there 
are others who themselves trample it underfoot.6 
6 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (London, 2003), p. 536. 
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A number of points derive from this passage: 
1. Tocqueville is saying that the fate of China is by no means 
unique to the Chinese and can be suffered by other 
civilisations. 
2. He is hardly critical of peaceful China, its prosperity and social 
stability. 
3. The ‘stagnation’ of China may not be entirely wrong. Adshead 
argues that China was at its most dynamic under the T’ang 
when it looked outwards.7 
Nevertheless there is much in Tocqueville’s description of China that 
can be described as Orientalist. But then there is a real issue as to 
whether the ‘Orient’ is meant to describe an actual reality or is just an 
imagined landscape. After all where does the East begin and what 
part of the world is it meant to describe? The idea of the ‘East’ is 
very much a moveable feast. Were not the Germans ‘eastern’ in the 
eyes of the French? The name of Alexis de Tocqueville should alert 
us to the central issue in this matter. The Orientalism that Hobson so 
deprecates only makes sense when it is considered as the inverse of 
attitudes to America. On the one hand we have orientalism, on the 
other anti-Americanism. European writers have often tried to locate 
themselves between the two poles of the East and America. But just 
as the America of their imagination bears no relationship to the actual 
real America so the East is not an actual place but a creation of their 
imagination.8 
Hobson argues that ‘European identity’ was constructed in 
opposition to Islam. This is an odd view. It is generally believed that 
European identity defined itself in relation to the Byzantine Empire 
and was consummated by the crowning of Charlemagne at a time 
when a Empress Irene occupied the imperial throne.9 Hobson says 
nothing about Byzantium and how Europe defined itself in relation to 
Byzantium. He also fails to recognise that there would have been no 
Crusades without the massive Byzantine defeat at the Battle of 
Manzikert and the crisis that it engendered in the Byzantine Empire 
7 S.A.M. Adshead, China in World History (London, 1988). 
8 On anti-Americanism as a discourse see Philippe Roger, The American Enemy, 
trans. Sharon Bowman (Chicago, 2005). 
9 See especially Judith Herrin, The Formation of Christendom (London, 1987). 
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with the loss of its Anatolian provinces, for so long the core of the 
empire. 
Hobson also has a very strange argument about the relationship 
between Christianity and Islam. He seems genuinely astonished that 
Christianity and Islam as Abrahamic religions could not settle their 
differences.10 He does not seem to appreciate the fundamental issue 
that while Islam could accommodate Christianity as an earlier, and 
inferior, revelation, there was no way that Christians could accept 
Islam. He makes the claim that Christians initially saw Muslims as 
pagans. This is not true. Christians most easily comprehended Islam 
as a Christian heresy as is demonstrated by its inclusion as a heresy by 
John of Damascus.11 
The sorts of mistakes mentioned above are fairly typical of 
Hobson’s historical approach that is driven by a desire to paint 
Europeans as evil as possible and their role in world history as 
disastrous. There are few nuances or subtleties in his approach. For 
example his discussion of the Spanish in America does not mention 
that there were Black conquistadors, that black slaves were first 
suggested as a means of saving the Indians or the pivotal role of 
Blacks in keeping the Spanish Empire functioning in the Americas.12 
Nor, in his discussion of slavery does he mention Barbary slaving and 
the fact that a very large number of Europeans were enslaved until 
the Americans and the English rid the world of this evil.13 
Equally while arguing that China may have been advanced 
technologically he does not point out that this did not prevent China 
from falling prey to nomadic barbarians, including the Mongols and 
later the Manchus. It was only after Qing imperialist advances into 
central Asia in the eighteenth century that this problem was resolved 
and China finally freed from nomadic incursions.14 Hobson also does 
10 Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation, pp. 108-9. 
11 Robert G. Hoyland, Seeing Islam as Others Saw It (Princeton, 1997), pp. 484- 
89. 
12 See Henry Kamen, Empire: How Spain became a World Power 1492-1763 
(New York, 2003), Matthew Restall, Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest (New 
York, 2003). 
13 Robert C. Davis, ‘Counting European slaves on the Barbary Coast’, Past and 
Present 172 (2001), 87-124. 
14 Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West (Cambridge, Mass., 2005). 
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not reveal that China suffered considerable environmental degradation 
as a consequence of her economic development.15 
Nor does Hobson really discuss the population differentials 
between individual European countries and China and India. The 
European imperial powers were tiny compared to India or China. It is 
amazing, given their resources, that they achieved as much as they did 
in the Indian Ocean. Portugal, for example, did not have the people 
or resources, to dominate the Indian Ocean. The Chinese were only 
overtaken as iron producers by the English in 1800 but then China 
had a population about twenty times that of England. 
One can accept many of Hobson’s arguments about the 
opulence of China and India compared to Europe, but the fact 
remains that these societies could not protect themselves from 
invasion by pastoral nomads. 
Hence Mote describes the situation of China at the time of the 
Southern Sung: 
There is no doubt that China had the most advanced economy 
in the entire world during this period when its military power 
vis-à-vis its neighbours was at its lowest ebb … military 
weakness did not have a stultifying effect on Chinese 
civilization, and in certain ways it generated constructive 
stimuli.16 
Wealth did not translate into real military power. The country with 
the most advanced economy in the world succumbed to barbarian 
nomads. 
Hobson is also so blinkered by an obsession with technological 
determinism coupled by his fixation on diffusionism. He fails to 
appreciate that technology is significant not as an end in itself but 
because of the way in which it is appropriated and used by particular 
cultures and civilisations. Printing was invented by the Chinese, but it 
became important in Europe because it was linked to literacy and a 
culture of conflicting ideas. By way of contrast the Muslims in the 
Ottoman Empire did not develop printing in the sixteenth and 
15 Mark Elvin, The Retreat of the Elephants (New Haven, Conn., 2004). 
16 F.W. Mote, Imperial China (Cambridge, Mass., 1999), p. 393. 
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seventeenth century but the Jews and the Christians in the empire 
did.17 
To give another example, it may be true that the Chinese 
initially developed gunpowder weapons.18 That does not equal a 
military revolution. The military revolution was not just about 
weapons, it is about how those weapons were used about forms of 
military organisation and the cultural and social implications of those 
changes. 
In other words, Hobson is not very sensitive to the relationship 
between technological change and culture. He is blinded by what he 
sees as the primacy of technology as the central factor driving human 
history. This lack of sensitivity to culture is reflected in his statement 
that Lancashire was the supposed place where ‘the first blinding rays 
of modernity were supposedly emitted.’19 In fact it was north of the 
border in Scotland that it has been argued that modernity was 
invented in the writings of the philosophers of the Scottish 
Enlightenment.20 
For Hobson technology and its diffusion from an ‘original’ 
inventor is central for any understanding of historical processes. 
Hence we find him determined to trace the seed drill from China to 
Britain despite any real evidence regarding this diffusion.21 In this 
case, but also in others, his method can be described as the ‘Da Vinci 
Code’ method of history. One looks for links and then creates a 
causal framework to connect them into a single causal chain. On the 
surface the causal chain seems plausible but collapses on any close 
inspection. 
Although Europe was apparently defective in developing much 
of its own technology it was extremely capable of inventing its own 
racism with the Orient as its ‘other’. He notes the importance for the 
Enlightenment of the link between climate and race as the foundation 
of Europe’s racism. But he then he gives the game away when he 
states that Islamic figures Sa’id al-Andalusi and Ibn Khaldun had 
argued that Europeans ‘were ignorant, lacked scientific curiosity and 
17 Philip Mansell, Constantinople (London, 1997), pp. 45-46. 
18 Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation, pp. 58-59. 
19 Ibid., p. 213. 
20 See Arthur Herman, The Scottish Enlightenment (London, 2003). 
21 Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation, pp. 203-5. 
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would remain backward’ because they lived in a cold temperate 
climate.’22 
In fact there are quite a few pages in Ibn Khaldun’s 
Muqaddimah devoted to the whole issue of race and climate. For 
example he states that ‘We have seen that Negroes are in general 
characterized by levity, excitability, and great emotionalism … They 
are everywhere described as stupid.’23 As Europeans ‘stole’ much of 
their technology from China, could it not also be the case that they 
‘stole’ their racist ideas from other civilisations? 
Part of the problem is that while Hobson decries stereotypes, 
when it comes to ‘oriental despotism’ he is happy to use them when it 
comes to Europeans. Hence he makes the claim that ‘Europeans … 
imagine themselves as liberal and democratic.’24 Well, some 
Europeans perhaps; the problem here is that he is confusing the 
‘West’ with Europe. Russell Berman argues ‘anti-Americanism is, 
fundamentally, an expression of hostility to societies of democratic 
capitalism.’25 Many Europeans in the past have imagined themselves 
as being anti-liberal and anti-democratic. To be a European has often 
meant claiming the middle ground between oriental despotism and 
Anglo-Saxon liberalism, or as it is better known, America. 
Hobson continually confuses Europe and the West. For 
example, he speaks of the ‘re-imagining of Greece’ as central to 
European identity.26  One assumes here that he means Athens. But this 
ignores the continuing influence of Rome, which as David Gress has 
argued, is far more important for Europe than Athens.27 Hobson also 
forgets how important the model of Sparta has been for Europe. Both 
Rome and Sparta appealed because they were not democratic, 
possessing mixed constitutions and traditions of unrelenting militarism. 
Americans are the ones obsessed with democratic Athens. 
On this score it is worth noting, as Patricia Crone has 
demonstrated, that the Islamic world had no real understanding of the 
Greek polis, as the one work of Aristotle they lacked was his Politics, 
22 Ibid., pp. 220 and 297. 
23 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqassimah, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton, 1967), p. 63. 
24 Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation, p. 226. 
25 Russell A. Berman, Anti-Americanism in Europe (Stanford, 2004), p. 52. 
26 Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation, p. 227. 
27 See David Gress, From Plato to NATO (New York, 1998), p. 97. 
  
 
Melleuish 387 
and hence viewed democracy through the prism of Plato.28 The 
political heritage of ancient Greece, as well as that of Republican 
Rome, is claimed uniquely by Europeans. 
Hobson makes the extraordinary claim that ‘had racism never 
existed and had the West viewed the Eastern peoples as equal human 
beings, imperialism might never have occurred.’29 I’m really not too 
sure what this means, except that Europeans were exceptional only in 
their racism and that because they were exceptionally racist they were 
also uniquely imperialist. Hence they were not any good at inventing 
things or creating the industrial revolution; European exceptionalism 
can only be defined by European racism and imperialism. 
Europeans, he claims, were unique in carrying out ‘ethnocide’, 
the destruction of other cultures through imperial expansion.30 Given 
that empires have been the staple of human political organisation 
since the establishment of what, for better or worse, we call 
‘civilisation’ this is an extraordinary claim. Surely, most empires 
have committed ‘ethnocide’ at some point or other. The Romans 
committed this crime, as have the Chinese, the Ethiopians and the 
Muslims, to name but a few. 
He argues further that because the Chinese under the Ming 
withdrew their maritime fleets this equalled them being good enough 
to ‘forgo imperialism’. No John, the Chinese understood the need to 
concentrate on their land borders. In the eighteenth century they 
conquered large parts of central Asia. That was hardly ‘forgoing 
imperialism’. Hasn’t Hobson heard of Tibet? 
Hobson compounds his problems by referring to European 
attempts to eradicate ‘Eastern identity and culture’.31 What exactly is 
‘Eastern identity’? Is it just another version of that strange entity 
invented by politicians and known as ‘Asian values’? Surely this sort 
of statement is about as useful as the term ‘oriental despotism’. 
There is a real problem in Hobson’s use of language, his often 
superficial knowledge of history and his tendency to take arguments 
further than the evidence allows him to go. What Hobson says about 
28 Patricia Crone, God’s Rule Government and Islam (New York, 2004), pp. 166 
and 279. 
29 Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation, p. 241. 
30 Ibid., pp. 241 and 258-59. 
31 Ibid., p. 259. 
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British economic development illustrates part of his problem.32 He 
correctly argues that war and state intervention played a highly 
significant role in the development of British capitalism. But he is not 
satisfied with this sensible argument; he wants to take it a step further 
and claim that Britain in the eighteenth century was a despotic state. 
A modest argument is always far more effective than hyperbole; an 
anti-European rant that not only irritates but which makes the reader 
question the many sane and sensible points that he does make. 
Hobson grants a lot to contingency in explaining the rise to 
power of Europe. The only agency that he is willing to grant to 
Europeans is that they were driven by an ‘irrational racism’. Now 
there certainly is a lot of sense in the contingency argument. Europe’s 
remoteness was important because it meant that Europe did not suffer 
the Mongol invasions that so afflicted the Islamic world; but it could 
not escape the Black Death. Europe’s remoteness encouraged 
Europeans to take risks to get to the rest of the world. Certainly it can 
be said that had England not had good coal deposits it is difficult to 
see the industrial revolution starting there. 
But there was European agency as well. There are things 
peculiar to Europe such as its family structure, the nature of the 
European state and the brutal competition between European states in 
what was for a long time the bloodiest and most militarised part of 
the planet. There can be no doubt that in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries it would have been far preferable to live in the 
Ottoman Empire or China than in Europe. Hobson seems to confuse 
agency and moral superiority. He wants to demonstrate that European 
success was not the product of Europeans possessing superior values. 
This is why he overdoes the racism and imperialism in European 
history. But agency does not necessarily imply moral superiority. 
There is what Hegel called the ‘cunning of history’; civilisations can 
succeed because of factors that their members do not fully understand 
even as they are driven to act by those factors. 
In the final analysis Hobson cannot explain why China failed to 
escape the Malthusian trap while Europe did. Certainly he is correct 
to point out that the European surge was relatively late; it is now 
generally accepted that even in the eighteenth century European and 
Chinese standards of living were roughly equivalent.33 In his 
32 Ibid., pp. 248-57. 
33 Bin Wong, China Transformed, pp. 22-27. 
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obsession with the evils of European imperialism he fails to consider 
the other side of the equation, i.e. what went wrong for a large part 
of Eurasia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Qing China in 
1750 was an extremely powerful state that could easily have resisted 
British advances; 90 years later it could not mount a unified response 
to the British in the Opium Wars. Christopher Bayly has argued that 
an ‘industrious revolution’ affected not only Europe but large parts of 
Asia during the course of the eighteenth century leading to 
commercialisation and prosperity in certain regions.34 Peter Perdue 
has also argued that by the nineteenth century China was no longer an 
‘agrarian empire’ but a commercialised society based on 
agriculture.35 If the ‘rest’ was already commercialised before the 
advent of nineteenth-century European expansion, and really not far 
behind Europe in living standards, it raises the issue as to why they 
were unable to build on the foundations that they had already 
constructed. Bayley comments that the political systems of Asia and 
Africa had problems coping with this economic growth.36 
The real pity is that Hobson spoils an argument that contains 
many sensible elements by simply going too far in his desire to 
blacken Europe’s reputation. He is seeking to break down stereotypes 
that he sees are Eurocentric. But in their place he just creates another 
set of negative stereotypes that do little to advance the historical 
argument regarding Europe’s place in world history. 
Richard Bulliet’s The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization 
has quite a different goal. Bulliet is concerned to demonstrate that the 
West and Islam are not engaged in a ‘clash of civilisations’ but are in 
fact complementary, sharing a common history such that it is possible 
to refer to an Islamo-Christian civilisation. He refers to this 
civilisation as a consequence of a ‘prolonged and fateful intertwining 
of sibling societies enjoying sovereignty in neighbouring geographical 
regions and following parallel historical trajectories.’37 
He raises a number of possible objections to this idea. 
However, he misses the major objection which is that Islamic 
civilisation is much wider than the Arab world and Christianity is 
34 C.A. Bayley, The Birth of the Modern World 1780-1914 (Oxford, 2004), pp. 
55-57. 
35 Perdue, China Marches West, p. 561. 
36 Bayley, The Birth of the Modern World 1780-1914, p. 58. 
37 Bulliet, The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization, p. 10. 
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broader than the West. Islam was meant originally as the form of 
monotheism appropriate for Arabs. Only Arabs were forced to 
convert to Islam. In the longer term Islam became greater than just 
the Arab world as it absorbed Persian civilisation and outgrew the 
Greek world that it had conquered. 
Christianity was always universal in intent; Paul’s missions to 
the gentiles ensured that. Even today Christians can argue that they 
have more in common with Christians in other civilisations than with 
non-Christians in their own civilisation.38 In any case what exactly is 
Christian civilisation? Huntington divides the Christian world into 
three civilisations. Where do the Orthodox fit into Bulliet’s scheme? 
Or the three surviving Monophysite churches? We could combine the 
terms ‘Arab-Islamic’ and ‘Latin Christian’ to talk of an Arabo- 
Islamic-Latin-Christian civilisation if we wished to be precise, but 
surely that would be a very clumsy term. 
The other objection is that closeness does not mean identity or 
even similarity. In the fifth and fourth centuries BCE the Greeks and 
the Persians were intertwined very closely. Does this mean that we 
should refer to a Hellenic-Persian civilisation? 
Bulliet is specific as to which partnership he wants to specify 
when he writes that ‘Western Christendom and Islam parallel each 
other so closely that the two faith communities can but best be 
thought of as two versions of a common socio-religious system.’ 
Writing with regard to Constantinople he says that ‘these 
communities played negligible roles in the growth of Latin 
Christendom.’39 Taken together these statements provide a truly 
bizarre historical picture. Islam was close to Latin Christendom but 
Greek Christianity was not. Was a Muslim ever Archbishop of 
Canterbury such as Theodore of Tarsus?40 
Bulliet then proceeds to compare Christian monks with the 
Islamic ulama.41 But surely Christian monks had more in common 
with Buddhist monks than with the legal scholars of the ulama. 
Religious knowledge and practice in Islam resolved itself into an issue 
 
38 Christopher Catherwood, Christians, Muslims, and Islamic Rage (Grand 
Rapids, 2003), p. 199. 
39 Bulliet, The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization, pp. 15 and 17. 
40 On the links of the Greek Church with Western Europe in the early Middle 
Ages see Michael Angold, Byzantium (London, 2001), chapter 6. 
41 Bulliet, The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization, pp. 24-25. 
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of law and culminated in the four schools of Islamic Law. The 
Islamic legal scholar was much closer to a Jewish Talmudic scholar 
than to a monk devoted to asceticism. Lawyers in Europe generally 
were secular as was much of the law. The development of law in 
Europe, with its roots in Roman law and customary law was quite 
different to the Islamic case. It is worth remembering that the Sharia 
needed supplementing in the Ottoman Empire, especially in the areas 
of criminal law and property law, by Sultanic law.42 This was 
because Sharia law was in some ways more like Jewish law than to 
what is understood as law in the West in that it spelt out the rules 
necessary to live a holy life. Hence Bernard Lewis comments that 
there were aspects of the Sharia that were ‘more like a system of 
ideals towards which both individuals and the community were to 
aspire.’43 
Hence when Bulliet comes to compare the Islamic madrasa 
with the European university he does not appreciate the 
distinctiveness of the two civilisations. He assumes that both 
civilisations were moulded by their religious traditions.44 This does 
not allow for the importance of the secular classical tradition in 
Europe. Islam’s inheritance from the Classical world was quite 
different from that of Europe. Just as Islam did not owe anything to 
the Latin world, so Europe was not an heir to the Persian tradition. 
The linkage between Latin Europe and the Islamic world only 
works because he cuts the Orthodox Christian tradition, and hence 
Byzantium, out of the picture. As with Hobson, Bulliet manages to 
discuss the Crusades without mentioning Manzikert, the parlous state 
of the Byzantine Empire or the Fourth Crusade. He then continues by 
making the following statement: 
Muslims today lament the fact that so few people in the West 
appreciate the massive transfer of culture, science, and 
technology that began during this period; that transfer, they 
maintain, paved the way for Europe’s later scientific 
discoveries and intellectual sophistication.45 
42 Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge, 1988), p. 319. 
43 Bernard Lewis, The Middle East (London, 2000), p. 224. 
44 Bulliet, The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization, p. 26. 
45 Ibid., p. 31. 
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But, it could well be asked, how much of this came from Islam, how 
much from the Greeks and how much from Europe’s own Classical 
inheritance? 
The truth is that many of Bulliet’s linkages and comparisons 
between Latin Europe and Islam are strained and lacking in real 
conviction. For example he tries to compare the ‘popular religious’ 
movements in late medieval Europe, including the Waldensians, 
Wyclif and the Hussites, with the Sufis. 46 This is difficult as the 
Sufis were mystics and are usually linked to non-urban popular 
religion that had a special place for saints. The comparison of Sufi 
brotherhoods with Protestant sects seems to me somewhat far fetched. 
Calvinists, who were protected by Muslims in Hungary, would seem 
to have more in common with the Wahibis than with the mystical 
Sufis who often had a special fondness for Jesus. 
Bulliet comments that the break between church and state that 
occurred in the Western world did not happen in Islam.47 Bulliet 
would have us believe that this divergence was purely the result of 
contingent factors. I think that there are much deeper cultural factors 
at work and that these are the result of significant differences between 
Latin Christianity and Islam. ‘Render unto Caesar’ simply never 
occurred in Islam because it never had a clear distinction between 
church and state. Islam and the Islamic polity were created together; 
Christianity was born in a state hostile to it; it had been in existence 
for almost 400 years before it became a state religion. 
Islamo-Christian civilisation is clearly designed as an 
ideological concept to replace the idea of Judeo-Christian civilisation. 
The argument is that Islam has been portrayed as the ‘other’ of 
Christianity. Putting them together in a single civilisation is a strategy 
for overcoming that ‘otherness’. But Latin Europe has had many 
‘others’. Sometimes Judaism was seen as the ‘other’, sometimes 
‘Eastern Orthodoxy’ and more recently, sometimes America. The 
‘other’ is a moveable feast depending on the issue under consideration. 
The one mixture that might make sense is that of a Byzantine/ 
Arab civilisation as the two danced around each other for centuries 
and often interacted. Both shared a Greek heritage while Western 
Europe had a predominately Latin heritage. But as we noticed earlier 
46 Ibid., pp. 34-38. 
47 Ibid., p. 38. 
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in the case of the ancient Greeks and the Persians proximity does not 
necessarily imply commonality. 
In fact the idea that civilisations are built monolithically on a 
single religion is a highly questionable proposition. In the case of 
Latin Christendom the secular traditions of ancient Rome as well as 
the traditions of the Germanic invaders have to be included while 
Persian culture was extremely important in the making of Arabic- 
Islamic civilisation. And what would modern European culture 
consist of if one were to remove the Jews? 
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the problem with 
both Hobson and Bulliet is that they are writing with a political 
purpose in mind, a purpose that often disfigures their arguments. For 
example, Hobson makes many sensible points and arguments, but he 
does so in such a way as to alienate readers and make them hostile to 
what seems to me to be a quite unexceptionable argument for a non- 
Eurocentric approach to the study of history. Similarly Bulliet has 
some interesting points but he takes them too far to support what is in 
the final analysis a tenuous argument. What is fascinating is the way 
in which both books cut Eastern and Orthodox Europe out of the 
equation as a means of strengthening their case. Both Hobson and 
Bulliet want to make direct connections between Latin or Western 
Europe and the Islamic world and to excise the ‘other’ Europe from 
history. 
A good contrast, in this respect, is the work of Southeast Asian 
historian Victor Lieberman. Lieberman shares many of Hobson’s 
anti-Eurocentric views but he is more moderate in his expression of 
them. He wants to develop ‘a more generous, less adversarial calculus 
of Eurasian difference.’48 Hence he is drawn to comment on Andre 
Gunder Frank’s Re-Orient that ‘in his enthusiasm to debunk the 
European Miracle, Frank made everything east of the Urals superior 
to everything to the West,’49 A similar comment could be made with 
regard to Hobson. 
Lieberman’s theory is that north-western Europe, north-eastern 
Europe, Japan and mainland Southeast Asia are all parts of a Eurasian 
subcategory he calls ‘protected rimlands’. In his two-volume history 
of Southeast Asia Lieberman is seeking to test this thesis and, in 
48 Victor Lieberman, Strange Parallels (Cambridge, 2003), p. 73. 
49 Lieberman, Strange Parallels, p. 74. 
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particular to look at comparisons between Europe and Southeast Asia, 
a sensible and useful way of proceeding. 
In drawing together European and Asian history and getting a 
sense of how they relate to each other it is projects like that of 
Lieberman that hold out the best prospect of increasing our 
knowledge and ensuring a more balanced approach. The works of 
both Hobson and Bulliet should be a reminder that overtly ideological 
approaches to history are more likely to harm the cause being 
advocated than to aid it. 
